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Abstract
Data on sales of memory modules are used to explore several aspects of e-retail demand.
Aggregate sales are examined in state-level regressions. Discrete choice techniques are used
to examine (incomplete) hourly sales data from a price-comparison site. There is a strong
relationship between e-retail sales to a given state and sales tax rates that apply to purchases
from offline retailers. This suggests that there is substantial substitution between online
and offline retail, and tax avoidance may be an important contributor to e-retail activity.
Geography matters in two ways: consumers prefer purchasing from firms in nearby states
to benefit from faster shipping times; and appear to have a separate preference for buying
from in-state firms.
1 Introduction
The recent growth of Internet retail (e-retail) has attracted a great deal of attention in
the academic literature and popular press.1 The future of e-retail is of interest for both
intellectual and practical reasons. Intellectually, e-retail provides nice opportunities to
examine consumer and firm behavior. Practically, e-retail could have significant effects on
the economy. It has grown steadily at about 25% per year since the collapse of the dot-com
“bubble.” And even a small e-retail industry could have a substantial impact on traditional
retail, which employs as many Americans all manufacturing industries combined.
In this paper we investigate aspects of consumer behavior that will have a substantial
impact on the future of Internet and traditional retail. We focus on two main issues.
First, we examine the extent to which the success e-retail has had is due to the de facto
tax-free status of most e-retail purchases in the U.S.2 This bears on the relative efficiency
of e-retail, and is important to understanding what may happen if states are able to tax
online sales.3 Second, we examine the geography of e-retail. It is commonly supposed
that geographic differentiation is an important factor allowing traditional retail stores to
maintain the markups over marginal cost they need to survive. Branding, obfuscation,
or other factors may allow e-retailers to survive even without geographic differentiation,
but knowing whether geographic differentiation is really eliminated is also important for
understanding what market structure might evolve.4
1See, for example, Goolsbee (2000), Smith (2001), Chevalier and Goolsbee (2003), and Ellison and Ellison
(2008).
2Forty five U.S. states levy sales taxes on traditional retail purchases. Each of these states also has laws
assessing “use taxes” on purchases that its residents make from out-of-state firms. However, the Supreme
Court ruled in Quill vs. North Dakota (1992) that absent new federal law, a state could not compel a firm
without substantial physical “nexus” in that state to collect use taxes on its behalf. The 1998 Internet Tax
Nondiscrimination Act makes explicit that web presence alone does not constitute nexus. While consumers
are obligated to self-report use-tax liability, few do in practice. Note that states are able to collect sales
taxes on e-retailers’ in-state sales.
3The Internet Tax Nondiscrimination Act has been extended to 2014, but there are two other ways in
which the de facto tax-free status of Internet purchases in the U.S. might be threatened in the near future.
First, the legal definition of nexus continues to be challenged in the courts on various fronts. For example,
Amazon is fighting the state of New York over a law that attempts to broaden nexus to include the presence
in New York of firms that earn referral fees for sending customers to Amazon. In addition, eighteen states
have joined the Streamlined Sales Tax Project in an attempt to simplify and harmonize their sales tax laws.
The Project’s goals are to encourage online retailers to agree to collect use taxes for sales made in those
eighteen states and, eventually, to pave the way to federal legislation requiring collection of use taxes.
4See Brynjolfsson and Smith (2001), Chevalier and Goolsbee (2003), Baye and Morgan (2004), Ellison
(2005), and Ellison and Ellison (2008).
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The environment we study is that examined in Ellison and Ellison (2008): we look
at consumers shopping for computer memory modules using the Pricewatch.com search
engine. For a period of approximately one year, we have hourly data on the twelve lowest
prices listed on Pricewatch for each of several products. We know the state in which the
e-retailer listing each price is located. Our quantity data is unusually good in one respect
and unusually bad in another. The bad part is that we only observe purchases from two of
the listed websites (both located in California), so we do not know how many consumers
purchased from other websites (or from traditional retailers). The good part is that the
data are at the individual order level and include each consumer’s location.
The structure of the data provides a nice opportunity for examining consumer pref-
erences and behavior. First, the fact that we observe the state in which each consumer
is located creates an opportunity to look at the effects of geography and taxes: we can
quantify the extent to which our websites sell more in states that levy higher sales taxes—
taxes primarily affect the firm’s competitive position relative to traditional retailers—and
to states that are nearby. Second, there is substantial turnover in the Pricewatch lists, both
in terms of which websites make the list of the twelve lowest-priced and in their price rank-
ing. Hence, there are many hours in which our two websites are mostly competing against
other California e-retailers, and others in which they are competing against e-retailers in
New Jersey, Illinois, Oregon, etc. with similar prices. Looking at how state-specific sales in
a given hour are affected by the competitors’ locations is another way to identify geography
and tax effects.
The paper is organized around two analyses designed to exploit different sources of
variation. In Section 3 we exploit the time-invariant factors—state-level tax rates and
differences in state-to-state shipping times—in the simplest way possible. We run cross-
section regressions examining the total number of orders received from each state over
the course of the year. These regressions provide clear evidence that tax savings are an
important motivation for online shopping: our e-retailer’s sales are substantially greater in
high-tax states than in low-tax states. We can provide an additional piece of supporting
evidence to bolster the case that the differences are due to taxes and not due to unobserved
consumer heterogeneity: our e-retailer sells much less in California than in comparable
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states. (This would be expected under the tax hypothesis because our e-retailer must
charge sales tax on sales to California residents.) These cross-section regressions provide
some weak evidence that geography matters for shipping-time reasons.
Section 4 applies standard demand estimation techniques in an unusual way to exploit
the hourly variation in the data: we estimate discrete choice models that use as their
dependent variable the number of orders of a given product from consumers in a particular
state in a particular hour.5 The nonstandard part of the application is that we only have
data on consumer purchases from two of the listed firms. Normally, one applies discrete
choice models to datasets containing all firms’ market shares. Having data on all firms is,
however, not necessary to identify the model given that we have substantial intertemporal
variation in the characteristics of the competitors. It is this variation that helps us learn
about substitution between e-retailers, how much attention consumers pay to geography,
taxes, and so forth, simply by looking at how our firm’s sales go up and down as rivals’
prices and locations change.
The discrete-choice analysis provides some evidence that consumers pay attention to
differences in the taxes between e-retailers. There is also evidence that geography still
matters. In particular, consumers are estimated to have a preference for purchasing from
e-retailers located in their own state.
Our work is related to a number of previous papers. The standard reference on Internet
taxation is Goolsbee (2000). It examines a 1997 survey in which 25,000 consumers were
asked whether they had ever bought products online. Consumers living in states with
higher sales tax rates are found to be more likely to have bought products online. The
big-picture conclusion is that subjecting e-retailers to taxation could reduce online sales by
24%. One motivation for the the tax part of our paper is to address a couple potential
concerns about Goolsbee’s work: an elasticity derived from analyzing whether consumers
ever purchase anything on the Internet could be very different from the elasticity of total
quantity with respect to taxes (which will reflect more the behavior of intensive Internet
shoppers); and one could also worry that some of the tax effects he finds could be due to
5These regressions include dummy variables for each state so that the results derive from variation that
is independent of the variation that identifies the cross-section regressions of Section 3.
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differences in unobserved consumer characteristics across states (driven, for example, by
California and Washington having high sales taxes as well as populations inclined to use
the Internet).6 Our tax results also relate, of course, to the literature on the effects of sales
taxes on location and consumer behavior in traditional retail, e.g. Fox (1986) and Walsh
and Jones (1988).
A number of other papers have used data from price search engines to examine aspects
of e-retail demand. Brynjolfsson and Smith (2001) examines consumers who visited Even-
Better.com in 1999. It has a puzzling finding on taxes: consumers are estimated to be
twice as sensitive to differences in taxes as they are to differences in item prices.7 It also
finds strong evidence that consumers prefer branded e-retailers over lesser known firms.
One limitation is that they do not actually have any quantity data. The quantity data is
imputed by assuming that that consumers purchased from the e-retailer they visited last.
Ellison and Ellison (2008) examines the same Pricewatch data as this paper. It notes that
websites attracting customers via Pricewatch.com have extremely price-elastic demand, and
investigates how it is that firms are able to maintain nontrivial markups. The primary ob-
servations on this count are that firms engage in a great deal of obfuscation, and that an
adverse selection disincentive for price cutting, like that described in Ellison (2005), ap-
pears to be present. Baye, Gatti, Kattumen and Morgan (2006) examine clickstream data
on consumers shopping for PDAs through the Kelkoo.com search engine in 2003. They
note that the lowest-priced firms gets a large number of extra clicks and address a number
of interesting questions: how price-sensitivity varies with the number of listed firms; how
screen- and price-rank separately influence demand; etc.8
We are not aware of any other work on spatial differentiation between e-retailers. A
number of papers have examined spatial differentiation in traditional retail, including Weis-
brod, Parcells and Kern (1984), Chiou (2008), and Davis (2008).
6Despite the examples of California and Washington, sales taxes in the U.S. are, in fact, not positively
correlated with the demographic controls for computer usage we employ. For example, Louisiana, Ten-
nessee, Oklahoma, and Alabama each have both one of the eight highest average tax rates in the country
and a below average fraction of households with home Internet access. Goolsbee casts doubt on the unob-
served heterogeneity explanation for his results by using extensive household-level demographic controls, by
including MSA dummies, and by showing that tax rates are not correlated with ownership of computers.
7This could be explained as an artifact of price endogeneity if higher prices are associated with higher
unobserved quality whereas higher taxes are not.
8See Baye, Morgan, and Scholten (2006) for more on search and and price dispersion.
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2 Data
In this paper we examine sales of four different types of memory modules, 128MB PC100,
128MB PC133, 256MB PC100, and 256MB PC133.9 Our price data were obtained by
downloading the first (or first and second) screens from Pricewatch’s memory price lists on
an hourly basis from from May 2000 to May 2001 (with some gaps). Pricewatch is a price
search engine where potential consumers can choose product categories, 128MB PC100
memory modules, for instance, and be given a list of participating retailers selling products
in that category sorted by price. Consumers can then click through to one (or more) of the
listed retailers to obtain more information or complete a transaction. Some information
on retailer location, shipping terms, etc., is given to the consumer on the Pricewatch page
before clickthrough. Pricewatch is still in operation, although the details of its interface,
the rules it enforces, and the markets it serves have changed somewhat over the past few
years.
Our data on the 128MB modules include information on the twenty four lowest-priced
websites listed on Pricewatch. The data on 256MB modules include information on the
twelve lowest-priced websites. There is a fair amount of turnover and reshuffling of the
price lists from day to day (and even from hour to hour in some periods). Over the course
of the year there is a dramatic decrease in prices. For example, in the space of a year the
price of a 128MB module fell from about $120 to about $20.
Pricewatch does not calculate sales taxes for consumers on these pages, but it does list
the home state of each retailer so that a consumer who knew the tax rate in his home state
(and understood that sales taxes will apply if and only if he buys from an in-state firm)
could take sales tax differences into account. We downloaded the state locations as well.
We obtained quantity data for these products from an Internet retailer that gets most of
its traffic from Pricewatch. It operates two similar websites, which typically have different
prices for the products studied.10 The quantity data again cover May 2000 to May 2001
9As described in Ellison and Ellison (2008), our e-retailer sells three versions of each of these types of
memory modules. The three versions are clearly ranked in quality. In this paper, we restrict our attention
to the lowest quality “generic” version of each type of memory module. This is the only quality level for
which one can easily use Pricewatch to identify competitors’ prices. Low quality memory also accounts for
the majority of our firm’s sales.
10There are several possible motivations for having multiple websites: they may be given different looks
5
with some gaps. The raw data are at the level of the individual order. We use data on
approximately 15,000 orders. The available data on each order include the website from
which the customer made the order, detail on what was ordered, and the shipping address.
Our e-retailer is just one of many listing products for sale on Pricewatch. A rough estimate
is that 100,000 other consumers visited Pricewatch during our sample period and purchased
a corresponding product from one of the e-retailers for which we do not have quantity data.
We also use a few state-level variables. The most important of these is the state’s
average sales tax rate. Sales tax rates vary by county and locality in many states. Our
data are averages across the various jurisdictions within a state computed by a private firm.
We collected data on UPS ground shipping times by querying the UPS website. These data
include both shipping times from our e-retailer’s zip code to each state, and a state-to-state
shipping time matrix.11 Our other state level variables come from Census Bureau datasets:
the fraction of households with home Internet access as reported in a 2001 survey, the
population of each state in the 2000 census, and the number of computer stores and gas
stations reported in the 1997 Census of Retail Industries.
3 Analysis of aggregate state-level sales
In this section we take the most straightforward approach to examine how the time invariant
variables in our dataset—sales tax rates and shipping times—affect consumer demand.
We construct measures of the total number of orders received from each state, and use
regressions to, for example, look at whether our e-retailer sells more in states with high
sales taxes than in states with low sales taxes.
3.1 Summary statistics
The regressions in this section will have 51 observations: one for each state and the District
of Columbia. We use two primary dependent variables: Quantity128 is the number of orders
and consumers may have heterogeneous reactions; it allows the websites to be more specialized (which
seems to be attractive to some consumers); it facilitates experimentation; it may help promote private-label
branded products; The firm may occupy multiple places on the Pricewatch screen.
11UPS provides these data on a zip code to zip code basis and there can be some within-state variation.
We typically collected data using one zip code from the the largest population center in the state. In some
cases where a state did not have one dominant population center and the shipping time varied we took an
average of the times for the two largest population centers.
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for 128MB modules received over the course of the year from a given state; Quantity256
is the corresponding number for 256MB modules.12 Summary statistics for the basic re-
gressions are presented in Table 1. Our e-retailer sells 204 128MB memory modules to the
average state over the course of the year. This ranges from a low of 19 in the District of
Columbia to a high of 762 in Texas. Unit sales of 256MB memory modules are about half
as large. The average sales tax rate is 5.7 percent. Four states have no state or local sales
taxes. The UPS ground shipping time from our retailer to the average state is about 4
days.13 The percentage of households with home Internet access varies from a low of 40.6%
in the District of Columbia to a high of 70.2% in New Hampshire. The average state has
230 computer stores. The ratio of computer stores to gas stations ranges from a low of
0.041 in West Virginia to a high of 0.184 in California.
Although prices are not used in this state-level anaysis, they are relevant for the inter-
pretation of some results. The mean price of a 128MB memory module is $70. The mean
price of a 256MB memory module is $139. A one percentage point difference in tax rates,
then, adds 70 cents on average to a 128MB module but $1.39 to a 256MB module.
3.2 Basic results
To analyze how the number of orders received from state s is related to the state’s tax rate
we estimate a negative binomial regression model, i.e. we assume
Quantitys ∼ Poisson(µs)
log(µs) = β0 + β1OfflineSalesTaxRates + β2Californias + β3ShippingT imes
+β4
ComputerStoress
GasStationss
+ β5InternetAccesss + β6 log(Populations) + s,
where the s are independent random variables with es ∼ Γ(θ, θ), and estimate the pa-
rameters by maximum likelihood.14 One can think of this as similar to estimating a linear
regression with logQs as the dependent variable.
12Note that in doing this we are summing both over the two websites for which we have data and over
the two speeds of each size memory module: PC100 and PC133. We do this because there is no reason to
expect that taxes or geography would have a different impact across websites or speeds.
13The minimum value of 1.5 days reflects that shipping times are one day for shipments to Southern
California and two days for shipments to Northern California.
14The Poisson regression model is the special case of the negative binomial with θ =∞. In applied work
it is common to find that a specification test can reject the Poisson model in favor of other models that allow
for more dispersion. The particular assumption that the errors are distributed like the logarithm of a gamma
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Table 2 presents coefficients obtained from estimating the regression above on the total
unit sales to each of the 51 states. The first column uses 128MB memory module sales as
the dependent variable. The results indicate that sales taxes have a large effect on online
sales. The 5.94 coefficient estimate on OfflineSalesTaxRate indicates that a one percentage
point increase in a state’s sales tax increases the number of orders our e-retailer receives
from that state by about 6%. The average sales tax rate in our data is 5.7%. Hence, in a
typical state, online purchases would be predicted to decrease by about 30% if the offline
sales tax were eliminated. Goolsbee argues that this is a good forecast for the impact of
taxing online sales—the implicit assumption is that achieving tax parity between online and
offline retail should have a similar effect regardless of whether it is achieved by increasing
online taxes or by decreasing offline taxes.
The coefficient on the California dummy provides additional support for the view that
what we have estimated is a tax effect and not an artifact of unobserved state-level het-
erogeneity. What would we predict about our firm’s sales to California if the coefficient on
OfflineSalesTaxRate is truly a tax effect? First, since our firm has no tax advantage relative
to brick and mortar stores in California—its California customers must pay sales tax—we
would expect its sales to be about 35% lower than one would otherwise predict given state
covariates.15 Second, our firm has a disadvantage relative to non-California e-retailers when
selling in California. One would expect that this disadvantage would lead to an additional
reduction in sales. The estimated coefficient on California indicates that sales to California
customers are about 67% lower than sales to comparable states. It is implausible that an
effect of this magnitude could be due to an unobserved distaste for online shopping on the
part of Californians.
The estimate on the ShippingTime variable provides some weak evidence that geography
still matters on the Internet. Sales are estimated to be reduced by about 10% if UPS ground
shipping to the destination state is one day longer.
random variable (as opposed to being normally distributed for example) is motivated by the fact that a
relationship between Poisson and gamma random variables allows the likelihood to be evaluated without
a numerical integration. The distribution of Qs turns out to be negative binomial which is what gives the
model its name. Section 19.9.4 of Greene (1997) provides a clear description of the model. Hausman, Hall
and Griliches (1984) discuss a number of models for count data.
15The OfflineSalesTaxRate variable is equal to 7.25% for California.
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The coefficients on the other control variables seem reasonable. Sales are higher in
states where the fraction of residents with Internet access is higher. We cannot reject that
the coefficient is one, which would correspond with sales being proportional to the number
of people with home Internet access. The coefficient on the computer store-gas station
ratio might be expected to have either sign: it reflects both interest in computers and
the availability of computer parts at traditional retail stores. The estimated coefficient is
positive but not statistically significant. Population is obviously a strong determinant of
aggregate sales. Potential reasons why the coefficient might be less than one include that
population is an imperfect proxy for the potential market size (which is affected by income,
business activity, and other factors), and that larger population states may have better
offline retail.
The second column of Table 2 presents coefficient estimates from a regression with orders
for 256MB memory modules as the dependent variable. These results are very similar: sales
are substantially higher in states that levy higher sales taxes on traditional retail purchases;
sales are notably lower in California; there is weak evidence that shipping times may affect
sales; the effects of the other demographic variables are similar.
As mentioned above, a potential concern is that the estimated tax effect could be an
artifact of omitted state characteristics correlated with both interest in online shopping and
the tax variable.16 To address this concern the third and fourth columns add a number of
additional demographic characteristics that one might imagine were correlated with interest
in online shopping: the state’s median household income (in thousands), the fraction of
households with a computer, and two measures of educational attainment of the over-
25 population: the fraction with a bachelor’s degree and the fraction with a graduate or
professional degree. All four of the new measures are positively correlated with the home
internet access and computer store to gas station ratio. Adding these somewhat collinear
variables leads to some changes in the coefficients on the existing control variables, but only
strengthens the tax-related conclusions.17 The coefficient on the sales tax rate gets slightly
larger increases in significance in both regressions. The coefficient on the California dummy
16The states with the highest tax rates are Louisiana, Tennessee, Washington, New York, and Texas. The
states with the lowest tax rates are Montana, Delaware, New Hampshire, Oregon, and Alaska.
17The Home Computer and Internet Access variables are particularly collinear with a correlation of 0.90.
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gets slightly smaller and increases in significance.
4 A Discrete-Choice Analysis
The Pricewatch environment exhibits an unusual degree of short-term variation in compet-
itive conditions. This variation provides a nice opportunity to gain additional insight into
e-retail demand and consumer behavior. In this section we use discrete-choice models to
explore substitution between e-retailers and the effects of geography and sales taxes.
4.1 Motivation
The analysis in this section is designed to exploit an important source of short-term variation
in our data: turnover in the relative price rankings. The following discussion should provide
some intuition first, for how that turnover arises, and second, how it might be useful for
identification.
Reshufflings in the price rankings are quite common.18 There are an average of 4.1 price
changes per day among the top twelve firms. Firms jumping onto the list account for about
one of these. Frims raising their prices to drop off the list are about 0.8. The remaining 2.3
are smaller price changes that just reorder the list. About three-quarters of these are price
cuts. They are usually one or two dollars and move the price-cutting firm up by one to four
places. In total, the 4.1 price changes result in 18.3 rank changes. At the firm level, there
is clearly heterogeneity in position preferences: four of the ten websites we see most often
have average positions of between two and four immediately following their price changes,
whereas four others have average post-reset positions between ten and eleven-and-a-half.
Activity levels are relatively similar: rates of price changes among the ten most frequently
present websites vary from 0.2 to 0.5 price changes per day.
The retailers selling through Pricewatch are not large firms with sophisticated opera-
tions research staffs. Some are probably being run out of the back room of a retail computer
store. The retailer that provided us with data is probably more typical: a proprietor work-
ing long hours; a single part-time programmer helping maintain the websites; someone
doing accounting; a few customer service representatives; and a shipping room staff putting
18All statistics in this paragraph refer to the 128MB PC100 data.
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products in boxes. The firm had dozens of products listed for sale on Pricewatch. The pro-
prietor would manually monitor the position of the more important ones on the Pricewatch
screen during breaks in his other management responsibilites.
The largest source of churning in the Pricewatch lists is a simple mechanical one: the
price of a 128MB memory module declined from about $120 early in the year to about $25
dollars by the end of our sample. Firms naturally cut retail prices as wholesale acquisition
costs declined. There was also substantial entry and exit: 113 websites appear in the top
twenty-four at some point during the year. In addition, we cannot rule out some demand-
driven price changes.
Figure 1 presents an actual example of turnover that is somewhat atypical, but makes
for a nice illustration: it shows the twelve e-retailers listed on the first screen of Pricewatch’s
128MB PC100 memory page at 9am and 11am on August 1, 2000. Note that two e-retailers
made price changes between these two times. Coast-to-Coast Memory of New Jersey, which
offered the lowest price of $112 at 9am, raised its price sufficiently so as to disappear from
the top twelve by 11am. UpgradePlanet.com of Virginia, which was on the second page of
the 9am list at $128, reduced its price to $111 and took over the top slot.
The first three columns show information presented on Pricewatch: the e-retailers’
names, their locations, and their prices. The fourth through the sixth columns contain
numbers not presented on the Pricewatch site but which consumers could compute from
the given information: the tax-inclusive prices that customers in New Jersey, Virginia, and
California, respectively, would pay if they purchased from each of the e-retailers.19
We use this example to help illustrate how price turnover is useful for identification.
Recall that we observe sales for two websites. However, we observe not just total sales
but sales into each state at each hour. This fact, along with the turnover in relative price
rankings, is crucial for our estimation strategy.
To think about how this works, suppose that our sales data were from Connect Com-
puters.20 At 9am Connect Computers’ tax-inclusive price for New Jersey residents is lower
than that of any other website. At 11am Connect Computers’ tax-inclusive price for New
19A consumer, of course, would need to know his or her local sales tax rate and the fact that sales taxes
are only assessed on in-state sales to make this calculation.
20Connect Computers is, in fact, not one of the websites from which we have data.
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Information on Pricewatch Price Price Price
Website State Price into NJ into VA into CA
Pricewatch ranking at 9:01am EDT
Coast-to-Coast Memory NJ 112 118.72 112 112
Connect Computers CA 113 113 113 121.64
Computer Craft FL 114 114 114 114
Advanced PCBoost CA 115 115 115 123.80
1st Choice Memory CA 116 116 116 124.87
Jazz Technology CA 117 117 117 125.95
Memplus.com CA 117 117 117 125.95
Portatech CA 119 119 119 128.10
Augustus Technology CA 120 120 120 129.18
EconoPC IL 120 120 120 120
Advanced Vision CA 121 121 121 130.26
Computer Super Sale IL 122 122 122 122
Pricewatch ranking at 11:01am EDT
UpgradePlanet.com VA 111 111 115.99 111
Connect Computers CA 113 113 113 121.64
Computer Craft FL 114 114 114 114
Advanced PCBoost CA 115 115 115 123.80
1st Choice Memory CA 116 116 116 124.87
Jazz Technology CA 117 117 117 125.95
Memplus.com CA 117 117 117 125.95
Portatech CA 119 119 119 128.10
Augustus Technology CA 120 120 120 129.18
EconoPC IL 120 120 120 120
Advanced Vision CA 121 121 121 130.26
Computer Super Sale IL 122 122 122 122
Figure 1: Sample Pricewatch rankings: 128MB PC100 memory modules on August 1, 2000
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Jersey residents is only the second lowest. Accordingly, if consumers pay attention to sales
taxes we would expect Connect Computers’ sales into New Jersey to be higher at 9am than
at 11am. Similarly, its sales into Virginia would be higher at 11am than at 9am. We can
estimate tax effects controlling for a home state preference by looking at how the magni-
tude of the 9am-11am drop in Connect’s New Jersey sales compares with the 9am-11am
increase in Connect’s Virginia sales. A comparison of Connect’s California sales at 9am and
11am will teach us about substitution between retailers: shipping times from New Jersey
and Virginia to California are the same, so the comparison should help us learn how many
consumers shift from the second-lowest to the low-priced firm when the low-priced firm
reduces its price by one dollar.
4.2 Methodology
Let Nsht be the number of consumers in state s purchasing a particular type of memory
module in hour h of day t from the twenty-four (or twelve for 256MB modules) websites
whose prices we observe. Assume that consumer k’s utility if he purchases from website i
is
uiksht = β1(Priceiht + β2SalesTaxisht) + β3ShippingT imeis + β4HomeStateis
+β5NeighborStateis + β6SecondScreeniht + β7SiteBi + ik,
where SalesTax is the sales tax in dollars due on the purchase, ShippingTime is the UPS
ground shipping time, HomeState is a dummy variable for whether website i is in state s,
NeighborState is a dummy for whether website i is in a state bordering state s, SecondScreen
is a dummy indicating whether website i only appears on the second screen of results, SiteB
is a dummy for one of the two websites from which we have quantity data, and ik is a logit
random variable independent of the right hand side variables (and of the additional right
hand side variables and the error ηhst introduced below).
Writing Xsht for the vector of attributes on the right hand side of this expression, we
have the familiar logit formula for the number of consumers in state s buying from website
i conditional on the total number of purchases Nsht:
E(Qisht|Xsht, Nsht) = Nsht e
βXisht∑24
j=1 e
βXjsht
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Our dataset only contains sales from two particular websites. It does not contain the
number of consumers purchasing from other websites, from traditional retailers, or not at
all. The total number of consumers buying through Pricewatch is affected by a number
of factors: there are clear day-of-week and hour-of-day effects; Internet use is climbing
over our sample period; there are substantial price declines that should increase aggregate
demand; there is variation in the online-offline price gap; and there may be intertemporal
price effects with the size of the potential consumer pool at a given time being affected
by past prices. Our data will not allow us to separately identify all of these effects. The
approach we take is simply to specify a flexible functional form for the aggregate Pricewatch
demand that could reflect each of the effects. Specifically, we assume
Nsht = δsqhe
γ1MinPriceht+γ2Weekendt+γ3T imeTrend1t+...+γ6T imeTrend4t + ηhst,
where δs is a state fixed effect to be estimated, qh is an hour-of-day fixed effect, MinPriceht
is the lowest price listed on Pricewatch, Weekendt is a weekend dummy, the TimeTrend
variables allow for linear time trends with slopes changing every ninety days, and ηhst is a
random error term assumed to have mean zero conditional on the right hand side variables
in this equation.21
We estimate the model via nonlinear least squares, using hour-website-destination state
sales as the dependent variable. The large number of observations reflects that we have
data on hourly sales into 50 states by two websites in up to 8000 hours.22 We carry out
the estimation four times to obtain independent estimates using data on each of the four
products: 128MB PC100 modules, 128MB PC133 modules, 256MB PC100 modules, and
256MB PC133 modules.
21Note that we do not include an “outside good” in the discrete-choice set as one might do to attempt
to estimate the effect of a logit-inclusive value on aggregate demand. We are thus implicitly assuming, for
example, that the total sales by Pricewatch e-retailers to state s are not affected by the states in which
the e-retailers are located and the difference between the nth loweset price and the lowest price. We do
this because we have little data to estimate such effects, think they must be small, and prefer a more
parsimonious model in which fewer coefficients are used to capture aggregate demand effects. Reasons why
any inclusive-value effects would be hard to find include that prices on Pricewatch are almost always tightly
bunched, and that, in any state other than California, having more than one or two e-retailers on the list
from that state is extremely rare.
22We drop California from the analysis because the fact that our retailer and most other retailers are
located there would make demand different under reasonable departures from our assumptions: “outside
goods” could be more important because there will be hours when all of the top firms are California firms
that would impose sales tax; and the impact of taxes would differ if there was a random coefficient on the
tax variable rather than a coefficient that is homogeneous across comsumers.
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Note that we are assuming that it is not necessary to use instruments for the prices on
the right hand side of the above equations. We think endogeneity is not a big concern for
two main reasons. First, we think the firms have little information about demand shocks.
We say this both because there is little information to be had—one would need to identify
demand shocks that made moving up on the list and then drifting back down over the
course of a few days better than staying put—and because our interaction with the one
firm leads us to believe that firms have very little capability to uncover sophisticated demand
patterns. Second, even if firms did have information about demand shocks not available
to us, we do not think it could be a large part of the variation we are using to identify
price and, especially, tax effects. Returning to our example, the tax effect and home-state
effect are identified by the sizes of the increase/decrease in Connect Computers’ sales into
New Jersey and Virginia when Coast-to-Coast Memory and UpgradePlanet.com switch
places. Both Coast-to-Coast Memory and UpgradePlanet.com make the vast majority of
their sales outside both of these states, so even if they were perfectly informed, one would
expect that their decisions about where to be on the list would mostly reflect national
demand shocks, not demand shocks in New Jersey and Virginia. With regard to price
effects, our main estimate is an effect of relative prices. Most rank changes do not reflect
active decision-making: the 4.1 price changes per day lead to 18.3 rank changes per day
as each price change bumps several other firms up or down by one position. The drift in
position between price changes comprises much of the variation that drives our estimates.
Even if firms were jumping up when it was a relatively good time be high on the list, we
would be seeing our firm jumping into a high position when it knew demand was good in
that position and being pushed out of a high position when other firms knew demand was
good in that position. Hence, it is not clear if there would be a correlation between demand
levels and our firm’s relative price. Endogeneity could be more of a worry with regard to
the price effect that is included in the number-of-consumers equation. This estimate is not
a focus, however, so we are happy to regard it just as a reduced-form control variable rather
than as a demand elasticity.
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4.3 Summary Statistics
Table 3 reports summary statistics separately for each of the four types of memory modules.
The unit of observation is an hour-state-website. Given that our websites sell zero memory
modules to a typical state in a typical hour, average sales figures at this level are quite
low. For example, the average number of 128MB PC100 modules sold by a website in one
particular hour to one particular state is 0.007.23 Price is the price charged by our websites.
Mean prices are about $70 for 128MB modules and about $140 for the 256MB modules.
The dramatic price declines that occurred over the year are visible in the minimums and
maximums for this variable. MinPrice is the lowest price listed on Pricewatch in the hour
in question. Our firm’s 128MB prices are about $2 to $4 higher than this on average. Its
average rank on the Pricewatch list is sixth. The average gap between our firm’s 256MB
price and the lowest available price is larger. Much of this is due to a period when one firm
offered these modules at a very low price. Our firm’s average rank is still about sixth. We
do not include California in our estimation, so all consumers in the dataset would not need
to pay sales tax to buy from our websites. They would need to pay sales tax if they bought
from an in-state firm.24 The average tax that would be paid if buying from an in-state firm
is about $5 for a 128MB module and about $9 for a 256MB module.
4.4 Basic Results
Table 5 presents coefficient estimates obtained by performing separate nonlinear least
squares estimations on the data for each of the four products: 128MB PC100, 128MB
PC133, 256MB PC100, and 256MB PC133. In many ways, the four sets of results are
similar.
The most basic fact about the Pricewatch environment is that it is intensely competitive
(as we previously noted in Ellison and Ellison (2008)). The coefficients on Price in the four
columns range from -0.40 to -0.81. The estimate for 128MB PC100 memory modules, for
example, corresponds to an own-price elasticity of -35 (holding all variables fixed at their
sample means). The estimates are extraordinarily significant. The decrease in demand that
23We count a single order of multiple memory modules as having quantity one. For most of our time
period, our firm limited purchases of memory modules to one per order.
24Customers living in states that do not have a sales tax are an exception.
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occurs when our firm raises its price (or is undercut) is so large as to be impossible to miss.
The coefficients on the time-trend variables illustrate the growth (and decline) of Price-
watch over our sample period. The coefficient on TimeTrend1 in the first column indicates
that overall demand was growing at about 2% per day (equivalent to 75% per month) in
the first three months of our sample (May-August, 2000). Growth rates for later periods
are obtained by adding all of the earlier coefficients. The estimates indicate that sales de-
creased 50% per month in the fall of 2000, and then declined by a very small percentage per
month over the final two quarters of our sample. Growth rates for the other three products
are similar, suggesting these patterns are not just product-specific fluctuations.
Figure 2 presents a graph of the hour dummies.25 They indicate that online shopping
picks up substantially between 7am and 11am, continues at approximately the 11am level
past the normal workday, remains at about two-thirds of the peak value until midnight, and
then drops off substantially until 6am. The large number of late-night purchases suggests
that greater availability may be an important factor differentiating e-retail from traditional
retail.
Intraday Sales Pattern:
128MB PC100 Modules
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Figure 2: Intraday Sales Pattern: 128MB PC100 memory modules
25Recall that we simply set these to the sample mean quantities for each hour rather than making them
part of the nonlinear least squares estimation. Sample means are computed on a time-zone adjusted basis
with the times of all purchases being recorded from the consumer’s perspective.
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4.5 Taxes
Recall that in our demand specification consumers are assumed to evaluate products on
the basis of Price+ β2SalesTax, with SalesTax measured in dollars. Hence, an estimate
of one on the SalesTax coefficient would correspond to the standard rational model in
which consumers care only about their total expenditure and an estimate of zero would
correspond to consumers who are entirely insensitive to tax differences.26
The most general conclusion we draw from the four sets of results is that consumers
pay less attention to sales taxes than the standard model predicts. The estimates in the
four columns are 0.05 (s.e. 0.08), 0.33 (s.e. 0.08), 0.06 (s.e. 0.07), and 0.95 (s.e. 0.38).
Note that the first three are significantly different from unity while the second and last are
significantly different from zero. We interpret this as evidence that consumers are paying
attention to taxes but not as much as to price differences of a similar magnitude.
It is important to note that the fact that consumers pay less attention to tax differences
than to price differences does not imply that sales taxes are not important. Our consumers
are extraordinarily sensitive to price differences, so even if the coefficient on the SalesTax
variable was 0.3, our estimates would be that a firm that must collect a 6% sales tax would
have its sales decline by about 50%.
4.6 Geography
Geography enters our demand model in two ways. First, ShippingT ime allows for the
possiblity that consumers may prefer to buy from e-retailers in nearby states because they
will have faster delivery times with standard ground shipping. We find limited evidence of
such an effect in these regressions. Two of the four estimates are negative and significant. A
coefficient of 0.05 on the ShippingT ime variable would indicate that the extra shipping time
required to ship a product across the country—about 4 days more than a local shipment—
reduces demand by a little less than 20%. This effect is, however, small relative to the price
effects in our model: a 50 cent price increase will also reduce demand by 20%.
26There are clearly other “rational” models in which the coefficient would be greater than or less than
one. An example of the former is if price is a signal of quality so that a high price-zero tax offer is preferable
to a low price-high tax offer with the same total expenditure. Examples of the latter would be a model in
which consumers have nonselfish preferences and value payments to local governments.
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Second, we included the HomeState and NeighborState dummies to allow for the
possibility that consumers may have an additional preference for buying from in-state firms.
Here, we find stronger evidence that geography does matter. All four estimates on the
HomeState variable are positive and three of the four are significant. Two of the four
NeighborState estimates are positive and significant. The magnitudes of the coefficient
estimates indicate that the home-state preference will roughly offset a two dollar price
difference. Such preferences could exist for a variety of reasons. Consumers may simply
prefer patronizing a local firm. Or local firms could enjoy a reputational advantage. Or
there may be direct benefits from purchasing locally, like the ability to make returns in
person.27 Regardless of their origin, however, such preferences would also favor a more
geographically dispersed e-retail sector.
In light of our earlier estimates that consumers pay less attention to differences in sales
taxes than to differences in prices, the home-state preference will outweigh the sales-tax
disadvantage on moderately priced items. For example, if the SalesTax coefficient is 0.33,
the Price coefficient is -0.5, the HomeState coefficient is 1.0 and the tax rate is 6%, then
the home-state preference will outweigh the tax disadvantage on items costing $100 or less.
The finding that the home state preference is nearly strong enough to outweigh the tax-
disadvantage of buying from an in-state firm contrasts with what we saw in our state-level
analysis. There, we saw that our firm sells much less in California than in other states.
Here, we find that it fares worse in other states when competing against a local firm than
when competing agaist other out-of-state firms. One way to reconcile these findings could
be a model in which there is heterogeneity in the home state preference. For example, it
could be that 25% of consumers have a strong home-state preference and 75% have none.
Then, when our firm is competing for California customers it must split the 25% who like
California firms with several other California retailers (resulting in a low share), whereas it
would sell less into New Jersey when it is competing for a New Jersey customer because it
would lose almost all of the 25% with a home-state preference and still face 10 competitors
27In practice, we doubt that the latter two effects are very important. We believe that many of these
firms are pure e-retailers who are not known in their communities and that most would not accept in-person
returns. The firm we visited did not even have a sign on its building giving its name, and explained that
this reduced the risk of theft. Having recourse in state courts could be another benefit.
19
for the other 75% of the New Jersey population. We cannot, however, provide any strong
support for this story over may others, e.g., it could be that consumers in some states have
a strong preference for buying locally whereas California consumers do not.
5 Conclusion
In this paper we have examined Internet retail demand using two different approaches:
a cross-sectional analysis of demand in different states and a discrete-choice analysis of
demand at an hourly frequency. The two analyses exploit separate sources of variation in
the data: the state-level analysis ignores all of the variation in competitive conditions; and
the discrete-choice analysis uses state fixed effects to absorb any persistent factors like tax
rates.
Our most basic conclusion on sales taxes is that they are an important driver of e-retail
activity. Our state-level regressions show clearly that sales are higher in states that levy
higher sales taxes on traditional retail purchases. The fact that the websites we study sell
so little in California is strong evidence that what we are picking up is a tax effect and
not some artifact of unobserved heterogeneity. The environment we study is somewhat
unusual in that consumers are highly savvy and price-sensitive, but in this environment
at least, we would agree with Goolsbee’s (2001) conclusion that applying sales taxes to
e-retail sales could reduce e-retail demand by one-quarter or more. In our discrete-choice
analysis we find that consumers do not pay as much attention to differences in taxes as
they do to differences in pre-tax prices when choosing between e-retailers. Taxes do matter
to consumers, though, and given how tightly distributed prices in this market are, they can
have large effects on consumer behavior.
The state-level analysis indicates that geography still matters in e-retail. The websites
we study make more sales to states that are closer to California in a shipping-time metric.
In the discrete-choice analysis we find that consumers have a preference for buying from
in-state e-retailers. We think this is an interesting result on the sources of geographic
differentiation. It has implications for market structure that would differ from what one
would obtain from thinking about shipping times. A world where consumers care about
purchasing from their home state could lead to a less concentrated e-retail sector with
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many small firms, whereas a world where consumers do not have a home-state preference
but do care about shipping times could lead to a sector dominated by a few large firms
that effectively use distributed warehouses to minimize both shipping times and sales tax
liabilitites.
Taken together we also see our results as suggesting that bounds on consumer ratio-
nality or consumer search and computation costs may be important. Taxes matter to our
consumers, but we find a less than one-for-one with item prices. Brynjolfsson and Smith
(2001), in contrast, found that consumers react twice as strongly to tax differences as they
do to item price differences. One source of the difference could be that they study an
environment in which taxes are explicity presented to consumers in a list that is sorted on
the basis of tax-inclusive prices.28
Technically, our analysis is standard. What could perhaps be more broadly useful is
our suggestion that discrete-choice models may be usefully applied to datasets containing
quantity data for one firm. Price data for all of the firms in a market are fairly easy to
come by. Quantity data are much harder to obtain. There may, however, be many other
situations like ours where quantity data could be obtained from one firm. (This could even
be done in a field experiment.) Our example suggests that this may be a fruitful way to
explore interfirm competition.
28Hossain and Morgan (2006) find that consumers do not fully take shipping costs into account in a
neatly-designed field experiment involving selling items on eBay. A commonality between shipping costs in
their experiment and tax differences on Pricewatch is that the shipping cost differences were easily available
in the item descriptions, but some effort would have been required to learn the differences.
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Variable Mean St.Dev Min Max
Quantity128 203.5 176.0 19.0 762.0
Quantity256 85.6 84.3 5.0 391.0
OfflineSalesTaxRate 0.057 0.021 0.000 0.084
InternetAccess 0.57 0.07 0.41 0.70
ShippingT ime 3.89 0.92 1.50 5.00
ComputerStores
GasStations 0.092 0.034 0.041 0.184
log(Population) 15.02 1.04 13.11 17.33
Income 41.35 6.29 29.70 55.15
FractionBA 0.15 0.03 0.09 0.22
FractionGrad 0.09 0.03 0.05 0 .21
HomeComputer 0.57 0.06 0.42 0.68
Table 1: Summary statistics for state-level regressions
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Dependent Variable
Quantity128 Quantity256 Quantity128 Quantity256
OfflineSalesTaxRate 5.96 6.33 6.14 7.21
(2.16) (2.59) (3.04) (2.93)
California -1.03 -0.84 -0.99 -0.81
(4.01) (3.21) (4.64) (3.43)
ShippingTime -0.10 -0.07 -0.08 0.002
(2.04) (1.32) (1.40) (0.03)
Internet Access 1.89 1.04 3.72 0.36
(2.62) (1.25) (2.82) (0.23)
ComputerStores
GasStations 1.90 4.39 2.61 5.48
(1.11) (2.29) (1.42) (2.41)
log(Population) 0.85 0.89 0.90 0.93
(20.54) (18.98) (22.77) (19.24)
Income -0.04 -0.02
(4.05) (2.01)
Fraction BA 1.53 1.50
(0.78) (0.63)
Fraction Grad 1.49 -1.54
(0.69) (0.56)
Home Computer 0.12 2.15
(0.08) (1.20)
Observations 51 51 51 51
Note: The first two columns report estimates from negative binomial regressions with
Quantity128 and Quantity256 as dependent variables. The third and fourth columns add
additional control variables. t-statistics in parentheses.
Table 2: State-level regressions
25
Variable Mean St.Dev Min Max Mean St.Dev Min Max
128MB PC100 128MB PC133
Quantity 0.007 0.085 0 4 0.006 0.077 0 4
Price 66.24 34.37 21 123 73.82 36.55 21 131
MinPrice 62.51 33.36 20 122 71.50 37.06 20 131
Rank 6.40 4.12 1 21 5.97 4.41 1 21
Number of Obs.: 793950 Num. Obs.: 707350
256MB PC100 256MB PC133
Quantity 0.002 0.047 0 3 0.004 0.064 0 4
Price 130.77 65.22 43 258 146.52 79.79 39 291
MinPrice 121.13 58.39 43 215 135.99 73.50 39 269
Rank 5.79 3.15 1 12 6.20 3.08 1 12
Number of Obs.: 645200 Num. Obs.: 648150
Table 3: Summary statistics for individual-level regressions
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Product
128MB 128MB 256MB 256MB
PC100 PC133 PC100 PC133
Variables affecting choices between sites
Price -0.56 -0.81 -0.43 -0.40
(64.17) (53.76) (37.08) (58.46)
SalesTax 0.05 0.33 0.06 0.95
(0.59) (3.89) (0.78) (2.50)
HomeState 0.47 1.40 1.06 0.75
(2.27) (5.83) (3.33) (1.21)
NeighborState -0.05 -0.34 0.73 0.64
(0.38) (2.33) (4.85) (6.95)
ShippingT ime -0.03 -0.07 0.06 -0.05
(1.28) (2.00) (1.69) (2.09)
SecondScreen -1.32 -0.60
(1.94) (2.68)
Variables affecting total Pricewatch demand
Weekend -0.42 -0.41 -0.37 -0.73
(20.38) (16.21) (9.42) (20.69)
MinPrice -0.03 -0.03 -0.02 -0.03
(14.09) (13.04) (11.00) (16.82)
TimeTrend1 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.03
(12.66) (15.39) (3.39) (8.47)
TimeTrend2 -0.04 -0.03 -0.01 -0.05
(11.54) (8.93) (2.95) (8.62)
TimeTrend3 0.02 0.00 -0.00 0.01
(10.36) (1.01) (2.30) (4.08)
TimeTrend4 -0.00 -0.01 0.01 0.01
(4.00) (5.60) (5.34) (10.86)
Observations 793950 707350 645200 648150
R2 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.03
Note: Dependent variables are number of distinct customers in each of ten states ordering
from each of websites A and B in each of approximately 7900 hours. Regressions also
contain state and website dummies. t-statistics are in parentheses.
Table 4: Discrete-choice model of hourly sales of memory modules in ten states
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